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INTERNALIZING ALDO LEOPOLD’S LAND 
ETHIC: THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 




Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with our 
Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land because we regard it as a 
commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which 
we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. (Aldo Leopold, A 
Sand County Almanac, 1949, viii) 
 
 
ABSTRACT: It is clear that environmentalist are failing in their efforts to avert a global ecological 
catastrophe. It is argued here that Aldo Leopold had provided the foundations for an effective 
environmental movement, but to develop his land ethic, it is necessary first to interpret and 
advance it by seeing it as a form of communitarianism, and link it to communitarian ethical and 
political philosophy. This synthesis can then be further developed by incorporating advanced 
ideas in ecology and human ecology. Overcoming the division between the sciences and 
humanities and granting a place to narratives as a highly developed form of eco-semiosis, these 
provide the foundation for a new grand narrative committed to creating an ecological 
civilization, a civilization organized to augment the life of ecosystems, including human 
ecosystems, by augmenting the conditions for its members to flourish and develop their full 
potential to augment life. 
KEYWORDS: Aldo Leopold; Land ethic; Communitarianism; Environmental Ethics; Social 
Policy; Ecology; Human ecology 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is one of the great achievements of modern civilization that we have been able 
to measure our progress in destroying the global ecosystem and predict the 
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disastrous consequences of this destruction. With a Google search, we can read 
histories of the scientific work that has revealed the destructive effects we are 
having on the life of ecosystems and easily monitor how well different countries 
have succeeded, or failed, in reducing greenhouse emissions, preserving local 
ecosystems, avoiding the extinction of species, revegetating land, and reducing 
the destruction of fisheries and marine ecosystems. We can easily see that, despite 
some local successes, globally, humanity is failing. We are moving, apparently 
inexorably, in the wrong direction. Advances in science and communications 
technology have produced a global environmental movement concerned with 
these issues, supported by the United Nations. By virtue of our civilization’s 
achievements, these environmentalists now have the means to see in action from 
day to day how, despite some limited successes, they are failing to alter the 
trajectory towards a global ecological catastrophe. The ethical concerns of a huge 
global movement are not translating into the required effective social, economic 
and environmental policies and the required socio-economic transformations, 
despite governments setting targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
purporting to deal with other environmental issues. Does it have to be this way? 
Social policy, insofar as it goes beyond providing the conditions for people to 
maximize their incomes, usually by providing the conditions for entrepreneurs 
and corporations to maximise their profits by extending markets, has focussed on 
either asserting and upholding the rights of individuals, protecting their lives and 
property, or maximising utility. Conforming to prevailing traditions of thought, 
most environmentalists have attempted either explicitly or tacitly to either utilize 
versions of rights theory to show that rights can be accorded to the weak, future 
generations, animals, species and ecosystems, or developed utilitarianism by 
acknowledging the utility or disutility of actions and rules of action to all people, 
including future generations (the greatest good [happiness] for the greatest 
number for the greatest length of time, as Gifford Pinchot put it) and, following 
Peter Singer, to animals which can experience pleasure and pain. While often 
seen to be opposed to each other, the imposition and extension of markets, 
individualist rights theory and utilitarianism have the same intellectual roots in 
the atomist philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, founded on the 
Seventeenth Century scientific revolution.  
It was Hobbes, inspired by Galileo, who characterized society as a product of 
a social contract and the economy as a mechanical organism driven by the 
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appetites and aversions of atomic individuals, with money being the equivalent 
of blood distributing nutrients, and it was Hobbes who reduced reasoning to 
calculating in the service of predicting and controlling. Locke made property 
rights the core of this contract, and characterized good as that which is conducive 
to pleasure and evil as that which is conducive to pain. John Gay, Claude Adrien 
Helvétius and Jeremy Bentham, elaborating on this characterization of the good, 
argued that the role of government is to maximise pleasure and minimize pain, 
using this principle to justify political action beyond the imposition of markets. 
Bentham’s felicific calculus for choosing right action by summing up pleasures 
and subtracting pains evolved into cost-benefit or risk-benefit analyses, 
quantifying costs and benefits in monetary terms. Breaking with such thinking to 
some extent, Immanuel Kant extended the notion of rights to accord a place for 
principles of action serving to uphold the dignity of individuals as free rational 
beings capable of respecting the freedom of others. The notion of rights, 
developed by John Rawls in the Twentieth Century, building on Kant’s work and 
defending the welfare state, competed with the Lockean notion of rights, 
defended forcefully by Robert Nozick. Nozick won out with the rise of 
neoliberalism. 
The problem is that this is the philosophical and cultural framework that 
facilitated the disembedding of markets from communities and the subordinating 
of people to the logic of markets, to use the terminology of the institutionalist 
economist, Karl Polanyi (1957). It is a development of a tradition of thought that, 
in opposition to Renaissance political theorists and the Sixteenth Century Nature 
Enthusiasts, opposed the republicanism of the Florentines and opposed any 
significance being accorded to nature except insofar as it could be used or 
transformed to serve human purposes. This tradition of thought involved the 
imposition of markets where none had previously existed. It promoted a vision of 
society as a self-adjusting market. This involved treating land, labor and money 
as commodities, that is, as something produced for exchange. But as Polanyi (p.72) 
pointed out: 
[L]abor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that 
anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically 
untrue in regard to them. … Labor is only another name for a human activity 
which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely 
different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 400 
or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man; 
actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not 
produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state 
finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, 
land, and money is entirely fictitious.  
Polanyi’s contention was that (p.3) ‘the idea of a self-adjusting market 
[incorporating these pseudo-commodities] implied a stark utopia. Such an 
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human 
and natural substance of society.’ 
The culture upholding this idea provided the conditions for the industrial 
revolution, a new kind of imperialism and the domination of the world by 
European civilization, endless technological development and economic growth, 
enormous concentrations of power, all of which have been driving the massive 
environmental destruction. The outcome is the exhaustion of resources, collapse 
of ecosystems and mass extinctions, threatening the environmental conditions for 
civilization, and the enslavement of most of humanity to the destructive trajectory 
of a globalized market based on free trade where, as the Japanese ecological 
economist, Kozo Mayumi (2001, 125), pointed out, any economic enterprise that 
is profitable is ecologically unsustainable and any economic enterprise which is 
ecologically sustainable is unprofitable. Scientific materialism underpinning this 
culture has also produced a pervasive passive nihilism that has paralysed efforts 
to effectively confront this crisis (Gare, 1993).  
There can be no doubt that rights theory and utilitarianism have served to 
ameliorate some of the oppressive effects of markets, economic growth and 
imperialism. However, with the extension of commodification from land to 
labour and capital to almost everything else, including mind control through 
advertising, public relations and media control associated with the rise of a global 
corporatocracy, many of the achievements of social reformers from the 
Nineteenth Century onward have been dismantled. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that environmentalists have struggled. Figures on what has happened to the 
environment since the 1970s, when the limits to growth were finally recognised 
to be of major significance world-wide, demonstrate that the environmental 
movement has so-far failed. On every measure, things have got far worse. These 
reversals in social reform and the failure of environmentalism call for a 
questioning of mainstream traditions of thought. 
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Such questioning has been taking place. Among environmentalists, the deep 
ecology movement inspired by Arne Naess illustrated this, and this movement 
served to mobilize a wide range of previously marginalized thinkers and 
traditions of thought, both Western and non-Western. While serving to make 
their adherents feel good about themselves, such thinking has not served to effect 
the required radical political, social and economic changes. However, Naess’s 
manifesto drew attention to a short work written by a forester and game keeper, 
Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1949). Here I will suggest that Leopold’s 
observations and the conclusions he drew from them provide a solid foundation 
for rethinking not only the relation between humans and the rest of nature, but 
also the relations between ethics, nature and public policy that could be effective. 
ALDO LEOPOLD’S LAND ETHIC 
Leopold’s land ethic is fairly well known: ‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.’ (Leopold, 224f.) However, this is formulated at the end of a book 
which details how, through his work as a forester and game manager in 
Wisconsin, USA, he came to appreciate how biotic communities function, how 
the destruction of animals or introduction of new species and various agricultural 
practices can sicken these communities, and then how ineffectual conservation 
efforts have been in the past. He came to appreciate that it was the treatment of 
land as property that was the root cause of both the destruction of biotic 
communities and the failure of conservation efforts by governments. So long as 
the pre-eminent goal of farmers and other economic actors is profitability, 
conservation efforts will be weak. Appreciating this led Leopold to deep reflection 
on what motives people. His conclusion was that people are ethically motived by 
appreciating that they are members of a community. As he put it in A Sand County 
Almanac (1949, 204): 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: threat the individual is a 
member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to 
compete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to 
cooperate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for).  
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, 
waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. ... 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
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community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-
members, and also respect for the community as such. 
In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is self-defeating. 
The conqueror’s role is self-defeating because conquerors assume they can 
fully understand what they have conquered, including who and what is worthless 
in community life, and they can’t. Leopold aligned himself with ecologists and 
embraces the science of ecology, arguing that ecologists know they can never fully 
understand the workings of biotic communities. They are too complex. This has 
become evident with ecological mismanagement in USA, for instance, assuming 
that its ecosystems could function without wolves to control deer populations. 
This does not mean that ecology does not reveals anything about how biotic 
communities work. Leopold embraced the extension of energetics to ecology and 
the subsequent appreciation of trophic levels, beginning with soil, looking at how 
levels are built  on this and then each other, up to apex species. He then called 
for the integration of ecology with history, arguing it is really impossible to 
understand history without an appreciation of the relation between human 
communities and their broader biotic communities. It is through such a history 
that we can appreciate that humans are part of a biotic team, he argued. The 
development of ethics and the need to expand it into a land ethic can then be 
understood through ecology. As Leopold (1949, 202) put it: 
This extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in 
ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as in 
philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in 
the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social 
from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its 
origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of 
co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. 
Politics and economics are really advanced forms of symbiosis involving 
cooperative mechanisms and ethical constraints, and function properly when 
they are appreciated as such.  
Leopold noted that despite a century of propaganda, conservation had 
proceeded at a snail’s pace. This is because people looked upon land as property. 
Just as Odysseus returning from the wars in Troy thought nothing of hanging a 
dozen slave girls on one rope because he suspected them of misbehaviour, 
because, after all, they were just property, so with land treated as just property, 
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property owners treat it is as though they have no obligations to it. Change will 
occur when the land is recognized as a community of which people are members, 
Leopold argued. 
THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITARIAN ETHICS TO INDIVIDUALIST 
ETHICS 
Leopold’s land ethic can now be recognized as a communitarian form of ethics 
and can be defended as such. Most ethical thought throughout history has been 
communitarian, assuming that individuals can only be understood as members 
of communities. It was only with modernity, beginning in the Seventeenth 
Century, that efforts to base ethics on individuals understood as ontologically 
independent of communities came to dominate. This is the ethical thinking 
associated with rights theory and utilitarianism referred to above, the ethical 
thinking that has failed in the face of massive ecological destruction. According 
to the communitarians, that is, those philosophers who in the second half of the 
Twentieth Century attempted to revive communitarianism, this whole tradition 
was a failure even on its own terms (MacIntyre, 1984). The communitarians have 
sought to revive ethics by returning to earlier traditions of thought associated with 
Ancient Greece, Republican Rome, Renaissance Italy and Nineteenth Century 
Germany. These have taken as their starting point in reflecting on ethics that 
people are first of all members of communities and could not be conceived in 
complete abstraction from them. As Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (1992, 
1) observed in their introduction to Communitarianism and Individualism (1992, 1), a 
major work on the debate between communitarians and individualists: 
The term ‘community’ is not new in political thought. In fact it goes back to Greek 
philosophy, to Aristotle’s works, thought Cicero and the Roman community of law 
and common interests, St Augustine’s community of emotional ties, Thomas 
Aquinas’s idea of the community as a body politics, Edmund Burke’s well-known 
concept of the community as a partnership ‘not only between the living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, 
and the works of Rousseau in France and Hegel in Germany.  
The philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel have served as the main reference points 
for defending communitarianism, and justice, loyalty to one’s community or 
communities and the realization of people’s potentialities tend to be the focus of 
communitarians rather than individual rights and utility. These do have a place 
in communitarianism, and it is giving a place to individual rights and concern to 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 404 
cultivate the character and authentic individuality of individuals that 
communitarianism differs from collectivism, which tends to reduce individuals to 
mere instruments of the collective. As the Nineteenth Century neo-Hegelian 
social and political philosopher T.H. Green argued, rights are forms of 
recognition achieved through the advance of civilization, not the product of a 
primordial social or political contract between asocial individuals (Tyler, 2012, 
ch.6). 
There are a number of facets to the arguments of the communitarians against 
the individualists. Apart from the intellectual incoherence of the individualists’ 
conception of humans, one of the most basic is that, however they try, 
individualists are incapable of according proper value to community. Partly as a 
consequence of this, they are incapable of providing grounds for concern for 
community, or even other people, and finally, for themselves. As Søren 
Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche concluded, such concern is reduced to an 
arbitrary choice, and as such, becomes meaningless. As Nietzsche (1968, 7) put it, 
nihilism, this weirdest of guests stands before the door. To oppose this conclusion 
the communitarians argued that all reasoning, including the reasoning of 
individualists, presupposes that we are situated within cultural traditions. And as 
Josiah Royce (1924, 16ff.) argued, cultural traditions consist of socially defined 
causes and orientations for action that give meaning to people’s lives, with the 
cause of the continued existence of the community and loyalty to this being 
primordial as the condition for everything else. We are formed as individuals, 
with self-consciousness and identities capable of rational thought, by the 
communities and their associated traditions into which we are born and then 
socialised. Even our capacity to critically reflect upon and  challenge the causes, 
beliefs, values and ways of thinking embodied in these traditions only emerges 
through being encultured by these traditions in the first place.  
To the opponents of communitarianism, this argument was seen to imply 
relativism, which is equally nihilistic. Even critical reflexivity could be seen as the 
product of particular traditions that emerged in history, not universal, and 
problematic for cultural health and for life. To counter this argument, Alasdair 
MacIntyre argued that traditions embody stories defining their goals, including 
stories of arguments about these goals. These stories or narratives are constitutive 
of these traditions, and of the individuals formed by them, of their projects and 
actions. They carry with them an imperative to accept at least provisionally their 
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implications for action and thought.  As MacIntyre (1984, 216) argued: 
[M]an is in his actions and practice … essentially a story-telling animal. I can only 
answer the question ’What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ’Of what 
story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one 
or more imputed characters - roles into which we have been drafted - and we have 
to learn what they are...  It is through hearing stories ... that children learn or 
mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may 
be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world 
are. Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers 
in their actions and in their words. 
In traditional societies, or in empires in which ruling elites enslaved the people 
they conquered and reduced them to mere instruments, there was no awareness 
of alternatives to these narratives (Horton, 1982), and narratives tended to be 
monologic, offering only one perspective as reality. However, where societies 
could not avoid recognizing the different perspectives of others, as in societies 
which consisted of diverse, interacting communities speaking the same language 
but without central control, people had to face up to the relativity of their own 
beliefs (Horton, 1982, 255). Ancient Greece was the prime example, and this 
condition engendered both philosophy and history as people strove to anchor 
their beliefs. The emergence of philosophy was associated with the quest for 
omni-temporal knowledge transcending any particular community. While 
fruitful and having continued up to the present, the quest for indubitable 
knowledge has failed. More importantly, Greek civilization led to the 
development of dialogical or dialectical narratives where different perspectives 
and ideas clashed and challenged each other, generating new ways of thinking 
through synthetic thought, facilitating the integration of insights from very 
different traditions of thought. The superiority of these new syntheses could be 
demonstrated by providing a unifying perspective from which the ideas 
transcended could be appreciated and their limitations revealed. Narratives 
facilitate making these judgements, and are required for judgments in complex 
situations. In doing so, their prime concern is with achieving justice, whether for 
perspectives, ideas, people or actions. It is in this way that narratives overcome 
relativism, as MacIntyre (1977, 476) pointed out: 
Wherein lies the superiority of Galileo to his predecessors? The answer is that he, 
for the first time, enables the work of all his predecessors to be evaluated by a 
common set of standards. The contributions of Plato, Aristotle, the scholars at 
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Merton College, Oxford and Padua, the work of Copernicus himself at last all fall 
into place. Or to put matters in another and equivalent way: the history of late 
medieval science can finally be cast into a coherent narrative.... What the scientific 
genius, such as Galileo, achieves in his transitions, then, is not only a new way of 
understanding nature, but also and inseparably a new way of understanding the 
old sciences way of understanding... It is from the stand-point of the new science 
that the continuities of narrative history are re-established. 
Not only philosophy and science require such narratives to advance in this 
way, but also mathematics. Once this is acknowledged, there can be no grounds 
for dismissing the cognitive claims of narratives associated with dialectical 
reasoning, by which traditions of ethical and political thought, and the causes to 
which people commit themselves, are judged (Gare, 2001; Gare, 2007). MacIntyre 
(1984) argued on this basis that the modern tradition of ethics, which displaced a 
tradition based on cultivating virtues going back to Aristotle, must be seen as a 
failure because it could not account for the achievements of virtue ethics, while a 
narrative told from the perspective of virtue ethics enables us to understand why 
modern ethics with its quest for universally accepted algorithms for determining 
morally right action, failed and had to fail.  
DEVELOPING LEOPOLD’S LAND ETHIC THROUGH ECOLOGY AND 
HUMAN ECOLOGY 
On a broader scale, such narratives are central to transculturalism, enabling 
societies to examine themselves critically from the perspectives of other societies 
with very different cultures, to learn from these cultures and inspire new syntheses 
of ideas (Epstein, 60ff.). It has been a feature of the advance of civilization that 
societies have provided the conditions for people to study and appreciate other 
cultures, whether of other civilizations or of primitive societies, past or present. 
Until recently, universities had departments of French, German, Russian, or 
Chinese etc., along with departments of ancient history and anthropology 
departments. Such work inspired new developments in history transcending 
particular cultures and civilizations, developing the perspectives required to 
comprehend such diversity. The work of the Annales school of historians, most 
importantly, the work of Fernand Braudel integrating history and geography, and 
Joseph Needham’s magisterial study of science and civilization in China, were 
major advances in developing these perspectives. Needham’s work in particular 
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showed how such narratives made it possible to judge the achievements of 
different civilizations and to relate these achievements to each other, thereby 
justifying the perspective provided by the work of Alfred North Whitehead in 
terms of which this narrative was formulated and developed (Gare, 1995). 
Being more civilized involves not only understanding and learning from this 
diversity, but also having respect for other cultures, even when this respect is not 
reciprocated. For instance, the experience of the land by some of the most 
primitive people, Australian Aboriginals, has come to be appreciated as a 
counterpoint to the enslavement of the land by colonists who treated it as mere 
property. Aboriginals, who had never practiced slavery and only engaged in 
minimal trade, regarded themselves as belonging to the land, not as possessors of 
it. Studying such cultures enables us to understand what it meant for people to 
experience themselves as part of a biotic community, and to better understand 
the brutal side of civilizations associated with the creation of indebtedness, the 
enslavement of others and the development of money, which, as Graeber (2011) 
showed, followed the development of slavery, the treatment of people and then 
land as property. These were the foundations for the subsequent expansion of 
markets, the creation of a proletariat, global imperialism, and then the 
progressive commodification of almost everything deemed to be of value 
(Gudeman, 2010). However, it is impossible for members of modern civilizations 
to simply return to the forms of life and perspective of hunter-gatherers. Rather, 
the sense of belonging to a biotic community is an aspect of a way of experiencing 
the world that needs to be recovered and incorporated into world-history to 
illuminate the nature of enslavement, markets, imperialism, and the tendency to 
reification associated with abstract forms of knowledge where abstractions are 
taken as concrete reality. The study of such societies highlights the drawbacks as 
well as the achievements of civilization, and thereby helps provide a goal to aim 
at, a social order free of alienation. 
The land ethic called for by Leopold can be seen as a recovery of what had 
been lost when humans ceased being hunter-gatherers. From a modern 
communitarian perspective, acknowledging the centrality of narratives to 
community, this appreciation needs to be seen in the context of a narrative of 
human history, taking into account both the brutality, destructiveness as well as 
the advances in the humanity of people in civilizations up to the present (Wolf, 
1982). Such history should acknowledge the destruction, continuing up to the 
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present, of people without such historical perspectives, such as the indigenous 
populations of Amazonia, who nevertheless continue to live in a way that is 
ecologically superior to modern forms of life that are threatening their existence. 
At the same time historians should also acknowledge that the development of 
history, philosophy, mathematics and science are major achievements of 
civilization. As noted, it is by virtue of these advances that we now understand 
the destructive effects of greenhouse emissions and can view on the internet how 
we are failing to check ecological destruction. Leopold aligned his land ethic with 
ecology, and further advances in theoretical ecology support his judgement in 
this respect. It has been argued by Robert Ulanowicz (1997) that ecology should 
now be recognized as the most advanced science, developing the forms of 
thinking that all other sciences, including physics, will have to appropriate. The 
development of ecology and human ecology, and the incorporation of human 
ecology and the advances in science on which it is based into history, overcomes 
the reductionism of scientific materialism and its associated nihilism and offers a 
way of appreciating traditional societies and their cultures, along with ecosystems 
and other life forms, through the highest cultural developments of modern 
civilization. 
The most important advances in ecology since Leopold wrote have been 
developments in thermodynamics, the emergence of complexity theory, 
including hierarchy theory, and bio- and eco-semiotics (Gare, 2002). These in 
turn have facilitated the advance of human ecology, recognizing that human 
culture is an emergent form of semiotics grounded in and built on biosemiotics 
(Gare, 2019). From the perspective of advanced thermodynamics, living beings, 
ecosystems, human communities, societies and civilizations are particular kinds 
of dissipative structures, transforming exergy into entropy, but doing so in a way 
that preserves and develops the forms of these energetic processes. The capacity 
to do so is associated with the emergence of hierarchies of self-reproducing 
constraints. As Howard Pattee (1973, 73f.), a leading hierarchy theorist and 
theoretical biologist wrote: 
The constraints of the genetic code on ordinary chemistry make possible the 
diversity of living forms. At the next level, the additional constraints of genetic 
suppressors make possible the integrated development of functional organs and 
multicellular individuals. At the highest levels of control we know that legal 
constraints are necessary to establish a free society, and constraints of spelling and 
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syntax are prerequisites for free expression of thought. 
These constraints introduce final causes into nature in which organisms have 
models of themselves, which in turn is associated with the emergence of semiosis 
– the production and interpretation of signs (Gare, 2019). Organisms are 
anticipatory systems responding to anticipated future states by differentiating 
themselves from their ambiance or environment and interpreting their 
environments as signs, to which they then respond. As Jacob von Uexküll argued, 
living organisms can only be understood in the context of their surrounding 
worlds, or Umwelten. Their environments become their worlds which have 
meaning for them, and they respond accordingly to preserve and develop 
themselves. With this self-concern emerges the first glimmerings of subjectivity. 
Semiosis facilitates communication between organisms so that their interactions 
are organized by semiotic constraints. As Kalevi Kull (2010a, 44) points out, 
‘Uexküll saw as a major task of his scientific approach to describe the multispecies 
community of organisms on the basis of relations between Umwelten of different 
species of organisms’. He was particularly interested in the relations the organisms 
have between each other. Developing this research, Kull argued that ‘The bonds 
of ecosystems are semiotic bonds’ (2010b). Such semiotic constraints are central 
to symbiosis by which biotic communities develop and act in a way that augments 
the environmental conditions for these communities. Eukaryotic cells and multi-
celled organisms are themselves highly integrated ecosystems in which 
components are not destroyed but function symbiotically through semiotic 
constraints. Ecosystems are ‘ecopoietic’, that is, they produce the ‘homes’ or 
niches for their components, which then participate in this ecopoiesis. Ecosystems 
evolve by providing new niches for components, which in establishing themselves 
and developing, contribute to or undermine the resilience of these biotic 
communities, surviving best when they augment the conditions for these 
communities and their members and facilitate the emergence of new levels of 
constraints that provide the niches for the establishment and development of new 
components. As Peter Corning (2003) argued, evolutionary progress takes place 
through new synergies emerging between diverse components of ecosystems. 
Ecosystems exist at multiple levels and are best thought of as communities of 
communities, with components themselves being ecosystems of diverse 
components. 
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Semiosis itself has evolved from the vegetive semiosis of plants where the 
interpretant is growth into particular forms, to animal semiosis where the 
interpretant is action, to human culture where semiosis is dissociated from 
immediate action and takes the form of symbolic action (Deacon, 1997; Kull, 
2009), a process whereby, as Jesper Hoffmeyer (1996, xiii) put it, natural history 
became cultural history, in which ‘swarming cells finally … turn into thought 
swarms within human being who [know] how to talk to one another and could 
differentiate between good and evil.’ With symbolic semiosis, people can see the 
world and themselves from the perspectives of others, generating the struggle for 
mutual recognition and the quest for objective understanding as central to human 
existence. ‘Objects’ can be perceived or imagined as hypothetical entities or as 
totally unreal.  
This opens up new possibilities, but new levels of semiotic distortion and 
deception are also made possible. ‘Objects’ in the ‘external worlds’ of humans 
include ‘self ’ and communities, artifacts and buildings, institutions and 
organizations, money, nation-states, texts, ideals and imaginary worlds created 
by art, mathematics, science, and other such entities that only exist as social 
realities through being symbolically signified. The symbolic dimension of 
semiosis facilitates greater reflexivity on semiosis and signs, engendering the 
highly developed capacity of humans to see the world from the perspective of 
others, to experience themselves as subjects with perspectives on their world 
shared with others, and to reflect upon themselves and their own and others’ 
beliefs. Above all, symbolic semiosis involves the capacity to create, embrace and 
live out, and then question and refigure narratives, with all this entails, including 
the capacity through achieving narrative identity and to define reality through 
stories, to project goals and organize and cooperate on a massive scale, forming 
new enduring communities involving new synergies and effecting major 
transformations of their physical and biological environments. By virtue of these 
characteristics, however, humans are prone to generating emergent forms that 
take on a life of their own, for instance, the tendencies of markets to expand and 
then corrupt communities, the tendencies of organizations to bureaucratisation, 
and the tendencies of civilizations to decadence.  
Human ecology situates humans as complex dissipative structures feeding on 
negative entropy and dissipating entropy while being complex anticipatory 
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systems having evolved within broader biotic communities characterized by 
vegetative and animal semiosis, but also having all these specifically human 
dimensions made possible by symbolic semiosis.   
SOCIAL POLICY, ECOLOGICAL NARRATIVES AND THE LAND ETHIC 
The dominant traditions of thought are based on abstractions that have denied 
the internal relations not only between individuals and their communities, but 
between humans and the biotic communities from which they evolved and in 
which they are participating. Invoking markets as a solution to problems 
reinforces the domination of people by market forces driven by the quest to 
maximise profits, further dis-embedding markets from communities and 
commodifying land, people’s lives and the instruments of exploitation. This 
continues to facilitate massive concentration of power and wealth both within 
and between countries. It devalues community and life and has facilitated the 
despotic rule by the global corporatocracy, strengthening a world order that is 
destroying the global ecosystem. Cost-benefit analyses reinforce the tendency to 
bureaucratization in society, putting power to make decisions in the hands of 
experts, who now tend to serve the corporatocracy. Assertion of rights can also 
be problematic. When overused, it tends to promote a decadent individualism 
asserting rights without obligations that further undermines communities, 
including the power of communities to resist domination.  
Institutionalist economics, giving a place to the study of institutions and how 
they relate to each other, and how markets can be controlled, is aligned with 
communitarian perspectives and does acknowledge that institutions are products 
and components of communities, while ecological economics recognizes that 
humans are part of nature with all the limits implied by this, and that land should 
not be treated as just a commodity. When integrated, as in the work of Arild Vatn 
(2005), institutionalist and ecological economics go a long way to overcoming the 
deficiencies of mainstream thought about society and its relation to the rest of 
nature. Such work was used by Vatn to formulate economic and environmental 
policies. However, to defend such institutionalist ecological economics and to 
really make community central, to overcome the fragmentation of intellectual life 
engendered by disciplinary boundaries and to facilitate the analysis of the 
relationship between economics, politics, culture and other dimensions of society, 
and to see all this in the context of the human and broader biotic communities 
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within which humans are participating and co-evolving, it is necessary to invoke 
human ecology (Gare, 2017, 179ff.). Human ecology, incorporating hierarchy 
theory and ecosemiotics and recognizing the importance of diversity for the 
creation of new synergies, functions as a transdiscipline, enabling other 
disciplines, including history, geography, economics and sociology, to be 
understood in relation to each other. As illustrated by the work of ecologists and 
human ecologists such as Stanley Salthe (1993), Timothy Allen et.al. (2002), 
Richard Norgaard (1994), Berkes, Colding & Folke (2003), Peter Corning (2003) 
and Alf Hornborg (2019), human ecology puts in perspective the complex 
relations between the energetics and semiotics of ecosystems, human 
communities and their cultures, their built-up environments and institutions, 
markets, money, technology, and destructive exploitation. It reveals the 
destructive consequences of the current world-system organized to facilitate the 
exploitation of the resources of the peripheries of the world economy by the core 
zones.  
Human ecology reveals even more clearly than ecological economics why it 
is necessary to oppose the globalization of the economy, to reject free trade and 
to develop local economies with local currencies insulated from broader markets, 
while still giving a place to some broader markets. It enables us to revision 
progress as movement towards a ‘patchwork quilt’ of co-evolving cultures, 
communities and economies, as Norgaard (1994, ch.14 & 15) called for. It also 
provides the perspective needed not only to uphold the value of communities, but 
to reinforce the feeling of belonging to these communities and to foster the virtues 
required for their defence and survival, while at the same time, revealing why it 
has been so difficult with the civilization of modernity to internalize the quest for 
justice for animals and ecosystems in the quest for social sustainability in social 
policy. The role of ecosemiotics in achieving this has been explained by 
Tønnessen (2021). Human ecology provides an alternative theoretical framework 
for formulating public policy with the potential to achieve this internalization 
(Gare, 2002). 
Invoking the perspective of human ecology is not just a matter of interpreting 
the world and ourselves. It is not merely a matter of seeing humans from a 
communitarian perspective. It is to challenge the concepts or categories through 
which people currently define their place in the world, their relations to each 
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other and to nature. For the most part, at least where social policy is concerned, 
people at present define the world and themselves through the categories of 
mainstream economics, the ‘forms of being’ as Karl Marx characterized them. 
Human ecology has the potential of offering alternatives (Gare, 2002). To begin 
with, human ecology affirms the reality not only of human communities but the 
broader biotic communities of which we are part, and enables us to evaluate these 
communities, ourselves and our relationship to them, and our sense of place in 
these communities. But more than this, in interpreting our place in the world 
through human ecology, utilizing the concepts provided by it or are being 
developed, we are participating in creating these communities, including the 
culture and concepts which help constitute these communities. Redefining who 
we are and what is our relation to nature, it changes us, our relation to the world 
and thereby the world itself. As Roy Rappaport pointed out: 
In a world in which the lawful and the meaningful, the discovered and the 
constructed, are inseparable the concept of ecosystem is not simply a theoretical 
framework within which the world can be analyzed. It is itself an element of the 
world, one that is crucial in maintaining that world’s integrity in the face of 
mounting insults to it. To put this a little differently, the concept of the ecosystem is 
not simply descriptive … It is also ‘performative’; the ecosystem concept and 
actions informed by it are part of the world’s means for maintaining, if not indeed 
constructing, ecosystems. (Rappaport 1990, p.68f.)  
Human ecology can reorient us in action by enabling us to recognize and 
commit ourselves to the communities of which we are part, in so doing, 
strengthening these communities, and also the claims these communities have on 
us. To experience the world form the perspective of human ecology, interpreting 
each situation and ourselves through this perspective, is to internalize the 
significance of animals and ecosystems, including human communities and their 
built-up environments, in the policies, projects and actions to which we commit 
ourselves. 
To deploy human ecology this way, it is necessary to utilize narratives. As 
MacIntyre argued, we normally orient ourselves through stories. Stories uphold 
causes for people to commit themselves to and they are orientations for action. 
Any complex human action, especially involving a number of people, involves 
formulating and telling a story of this action by which actors understand what 
causes are worth committing to, what are their goals and how particular goals 
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relate to the actions and goals of other actors and the broader causes, actions and 
goals with which all the actors are engaged. By relating actions and actors to each 
other, narratives define and integrate communities, including the beliefs and 
commitment to causes constituting these communities. As Richard Norgaard 
(1994, 181f.) observed: ‘Every culture has a life story … Shared life stories place 
people in their physical and biological surroundings, connect them to their 
ancestors and descendants, remind them of their obligations and vulnerability, 
and escort  their daily thoughts and behaviour.’ It is through embracing the stories 
of one’s communities that one develops loyalty to these communities. If human 
ecology is to be inclusive, it must acknowledge the crucial importance of these 
stories or narratives. Narratives in turn, understood through biosemiotics and 
human ecology, can provide support for human ecology by extending it, 
recognizing the historical dimension of ecosystems, small and large, upholding a 
form of naturalism that recognizes the unique potential or humans to define and 
organize themselves through stories, and then to develop more abstract forms of 
thinking associated with science and mathematics (Gare, 2007).  
In fact stories can encompass the history of  the entire cosmos, including the 
history of the formation of the solar system, of the emergence of life on Earth, of 
the evolution of life and complexes of ecosystems to engender humanity, complex 
societies and civilizations with their advanced cultures, and of people 
constructing these stories. When living beings are understood non-
reductionistically through biosemiotics, the intrinsic significance of plants, 
animals and ecosystems can be appreciated along with human communities, 
societies, civilizations and individual people. This becomes evident when reading 
works such as Peter Wohlleben’s The Hidden Life of  Trees (2016), revealing how they 
feel, communicate and cooperate. Stories, formulated from the perspective of 
human ecology, can encompass and accord recognition and appreciation of the 
culture and forms of life of people who do not share or even know about the 
stories through which they and their forms of life are interpreted. For instance, 
the culture and forms of life of indigenous Amazonians, can be defended from 
the perspective of human ecology for having augmented their biotic 
communities, while people of European descent organized into a global system 
of exploitation, who are destroying these biotic communities, can be more 
effectively challenged, as they have been by Stephen Bunker (1988) and Richard 
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Norgaard (1994). Such narratives can also encompass and acknowledge the 
significance of the semiosis and lives of non-human organisms, including plants 
and cells as participants in biotic communities. 
There is an alternative to current ways of formulating policies which augment 
rather than undermine the role of stories in communities. This is retrospective 
path analysis. As developed by Cliff Hooker, retrospective path analysis consists 
in firstly, the selection of macro-economic goals by considering a variety of end-
points forty to fifty years in the future, and then secondly, examining various 
paths to the desired future state. However there is no reason why this cannot be 
extended to considering goals for the whole of civilization several centuries into 
the future, for instance, creating a global ecological civilization organized to 
augment the life of the ecosystems, including the global ecosystem, and working 
out the required sub-goals for achieving these. This procedure departs from the 
normal approach in calculating a course of action retrospectively from some 
future date, specifying ’those key transitions in social structure and functioning 
generally which, taken in proper sequence, will lead from the present to the 
desired future social condition’ (Hooker, 1982, 17). This procedure focuses 
attention on the conditions necessary for achieving the desired future states, on 
the tendencies inimical to their realization, and on the crucial societal decisions 
at the branchpoints of different possible paths of development. Clearly this is 
accords with the structure of stories, and fits easily with the way people normally 
form projects and then act to realize these. Further developments of the narrative 
approach to policy formation have been  made by Emory Roe (1994). 
Stories always assume a context as well as component agents and actions. 
They allow for rival projects and rival storylines, and grant a place to reflexivity. 
As far as the narrative of any community is concerned, the ultimate long-term 
project is the continued viability of the community. One could think of this 
viability as its sustainability, but usually, sustainability only becomes a focus in 
crisis situations. Viability is more generally understood as the health of the 
community, associated with its resilience in the face of perturbations, attacks or 
disease. A resilient community is a healthier and more alive community, and it 
has been argued that what we perceive as beautiful is what is more alive or 
conducive to life in this sense. Communities are resilient when they augment each 
other’s health, whether their component communities or the broader 
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communities of which they are part, and stories can acknowledge a multiplicity 
of co-evolving communities or communities of communities. The stories of more 
primitive societies generally acknowledged this, but as Norgaard (1994, 182) 
noted, the ‘Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions introduced a life story … [which] 
came to be interpreted as a grand design. A single God came to be interpreted 
as having given people dominion over all. It is an atomistic and hierarchical story 
with clear dominance and vague responsibilities.’ From a Bakhtinian perspective, 
this life story became a monological grand narrative reducing everyone and 
everything to instruments to achieve the final end, whether this be the 
destruction of the world in a final conflagration or its total technological control 
(Gare, 1996). However, it is possible and necessary with the help of human 
ecology to construct a dialogic grand narrative of ecological civilization, able to 
grant a place to all these communities and relations between them and inspire 
people to embrace all these different levels, promoting concern for justice at all 
levels of community, promoting life as the ultimate value of civilization. The 
commitment to justice, as giving life, people and all living beings their due, is 
implicit in stories, and as such, is the foundation of communities and, as 
MacIntyre (1983, 244), upholding a claim by Aristotle, argued, is the first virtue 
of political life.  
It is through this commitment to justice within communities that solidarity is 
achieved and maintained. With a dialogic grand narrative, it should be possible 
to achieve this solidarity with the whole of humanity and with the global 
community of life on Earth, not just as an idea but incorporated into practices 
and forms of life, consistent with achieving this solidarity at more local levels and 
mobilizing communities at every level to combat the threats to the life of these 
communities coming from whatever level. This will involve a multileveled 
federalism, achieving organized decentralization of power and protecting the 
means to achieve and maintain this decentralization. The work of Vandana Shiva 
in India promoting earth democracy and reviving traditional forms of 
agriculture, the promoters and practitioners of ecological civilization in China, at 
the local level those reclaiming the Gobi desert, and in the West, the defence of 
agricultural communities committed to farming in a way that sustains both rural 
communities and ecosystems, illustrate such reorientations taking place. 
Transition towns, committed to zero greenhouse gas emissions, are the latest 
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development in this regard. In each case, the greatest threat comes from 
transnational agribusiness companies, supported by  governments, defining land 
as nothing but a commodity and motivated purely by the quest for profit 
(Lawrence, 1987; Cobb & Daly, 1994, ch.13 & 14; Douthwaite, 1996; Douthwaite 
& Fallon, 2011). 
The commitment to justice can also involve appreciating the value of 
institutions and ways of thinking, which while having destructive tendencies, have 
also been productive. Markets, and even military conflicts, have facilitated great 
creativity and the capacity to coordinate people’s activities, as Peter Turchin 
(2016) has argued. Any future society is unlikely to survive without some markets, 
and state institutions, developed through a long history of wars, are required to 
coordinate activity. To do them justice, they need to be given a place, but re-
embedded in communities and made to serve them. As David Miller (1989) 
argued, in the modern world we need market socialism. Such market socialism 
needs to acknowledge national communities as well as more local and broader, 
international communities. There should also be some place for cost-benefit 
analyses, but always understood and ultimately judged through and subordinated 
to narratives of communities which define their goals. The institutionalization of 
rights should also be recognized as important for the advance of civilization, 
provided these rights are understood, as T.H. Green, argued, as institutional 
achievements of communities. Markets, and utilitarian and rights claims, should 
always be subordinated to and understood in relation to the quest for justice 
within communities, institutionalized as the proper recognition of the significance 
of all beings or the means for achieving this recognition. Such institutionalized 
recognition developed first of all in countries, associated with the institutions of 
states. The concern with justice as proper recognition, originating in small 
communities such as the Ancient Greek city states eventually inspired the 
creation of a global community as a community of communities, 
institutionalizing recognition of all such communities, most importantly, through 
the United Nations and its subordinate institutions. These have been committed 
to augmenting the health of their member communities, from major regions, to 
nations, to local communities, and the various institutions and organizations that 
serve them. The global ecological crisis is forcing people to extend concern with 
justice and the associated sense of community not only to the whole of humanity 
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but to all living beings on Earth as members of the global ecosystem, the 
semiosphere, or as James Lovelock (1991) called it, Gaia. This can now be 
understood as a global ecological civilization (Gare, 2017). Aldo Leopold’s land 
ethic is of necessity becoming a real force, and the struggle now is to 
institutionalize it from the local to the global level, to embody it in our sense of 
who we are and what is our relationship to the land in our everyday practices and 
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